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Abstract. In this paper I trace Husserl’s transformation of his notion of phantasy from its
strong leanings towards empiricism into a transcendental phenomenology of imagination. Re-
jecting the view that this account is only more incompatible with contemporary neuroscientific
research, I instead claim that the transcendental suspension of naturalistic (or scientific) pre-
tensions precisely enables cooperation between the two distinct realms of phenomenology and
science. In particular, a transcendental account of phantasy can disclose the specific accom-
plishments of imagination without prematurely deciding upon a particular scientific paradigm
for its experimental investigation; a decision that is best left to the sciences themselves.
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Introduction
Despite Husserl’s well-known and often quoted announcement that fiction is
“das Lebenselement der Pha¨nomenologie” (Husserl 1980, p. 148), that is, the
‘vital element’ that makes up the very life of phenomenology, his account
of phantasy has been repeatedly characterized as unsatisfactory. The most
common objection is that Husserl, although he rejects the Humean under-
standing of imagination as ‘faint copy’ of sensation, nevertheless degrades
phantasy to a poor imitation of perception. Phantasy is described by him as
quasi-perception (cf. Drost 1990; Sallis 1992; Saraiva 1970, p. 251). Further,
Husserl has been criticized for remaining indebted to empiricism by claiming
that phantasies are constituted by a specific apprehension of sensory contents.
Finally, while Husserl is often credited for ascribing methodological merit to
phantasy in his notion of eidetic variation, this ‘merit’ is often itself perceived
as one of the most questionable elements of the phenomenological method.
Thus, in the light of these objections, Husserl indeed appears to be “yet one
more in the tradition of writers whose words do not match his deeds in the
affairs of the imagination” (Brann 1991, p. 122).
Yet, Husserl discusses phantasy not only in the manuscripts explicitly en-
gaged in its description (published in Husserl 1980), but in almost all his
philosophical works spanning from the Logical Investigations (1900/1901) to
the posthumously published Experience and Judgment (1939). In this paper,
I will first offer an explanation for the apparent tension between the criti-
cal systematic importance Husserl attributes to the notion of phantasy for
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phenomenology and shortcomings repeatedly pointed out by his critics. In
short, this tension ensues from what I call the ‘early account’ of phantasy,
which is based on the content–apprehension–schema. It assumes the occur-
rence of phantasmata (phantasmatic contents) turned into phantasies by a spe-
cific mode of apprehension – a conception of phantasy that, in my opinion,
indeed justifies the charge of empiricism. In the second section of this paper, I
want to draw attention to a less crude conception of phantasy that Husserl de-
velops in his later writings, in which he claims that all acts are ‘consciousness
through and through’ [Bewußtsein durch und durch] (Husserl 1980, text 8
[1909] p. 265).2 This latter view marks the crucial step towards a transcen-
dental phenomenology of imagination, which I will expound in the third part
of this paper. It finally refutes the supremacy of perception and overcomes the
empiricist legacy in order to give way to a ‘first philosophy of phantasy.’
What these three parts of my paper leave untouched, however, is the under-
lying value judgment that Husserl’s turn away from an empiricist explanation
and toward a transcendental clarification means indeed an improvement of his
account. Especially in view of recent attempts to ‘naturalize’ phenomenology,
this assumption cannot simply be taken for granted but clearly requires an ar-
gument for its defense. The growing affinity with cognitive science could be
taken to suggest that phenomenology becomes more useful the more empiri-
cist it becomes. In fact, the project of transcendental phenomenology might
appear outdated and naı¨ve. In the conclusion, I will therefore outline what
I think a specifically transcendental phenomenological account has to offer
for a fruitful cooperative investigation of imagination in phenomenology and
cognitive science.3
Empiricist vestiges: Husserl’s early account of imagination
The parallelism between perception and phantasy remains the leading sys-
tematic idea of Husserl’s investigations of imagination throughout the years
(cf. Husserl 1984, p. 679 f.; Husserl 1969, p. 128; Husserl 1959, p.115 and
119; Husserl 1973a, p. 21 f.) Perception is a presentation [Gegenwa¨rtigung],
“in which the object appears to us, so to speak, ‘in person’ [leibhaftig], as it-
self present.” Phantasy, conversely, is a presentification [Vergegenwa¨rtigung],
“in which the object appears but does so not as present, rather as merely pre-
sentified [vergegenwa¨rtigt]. It appears as if it was there but only as if . . . ”
(Husserl 1980, text 1 [1904/05], p. 16). Despite this distinct difference, how-
ever, phantasy is like perception in all essential respects; it is as if-perception.
On the basis of this parallelism Husserl enlarges the concept of experience [Er-
fahrung], or intuition [Anschauung] so that it then includes perception as well
as quasi-perception, i.e. phantasy. This turns the parallelism of perception and
phantasy into a crucial moment in the development of the phenomenological
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method. This is because the enlargement of the concept of experience, allowed
by the structural similarities between perception and phantasy, is a necessary
condition for phenomenological analysis.
First, the parallelism of perception and phantasy can be regarded as the jus-
tification for using phantasy as an illustrative model for experience in general.
Accordingly, whatever moments or relations are made evident in phantasy are
also taken to be evident for perception, or for experience in general. Second,
the intuition of essences in particular requires the parallelism between per-
ception and phantasy. For, if there was a difference between the essence that
we access by means of eidetic variation in phantasy and another essence that
is issued by comparing actual perceptions, then it would obviously be very
difficult for Husserl to defend his talk of essences at all. The notion of essence,
after all, implies that it is possible to disregard any difference between its per-
ceptual or phantasmal exemplifications. “The eidos,” Husserl clearly states in
Section 3 of Ideas I, “the pure essence, can exemplify itself intuitively (. . .)
in what is given in perception (. . .), but just as well in what is given in mere
phantasy” (Husserl 1950, p. 13; cf. Husserl 1984, pp. 634 f., 661). In short,
what is a priori about the essence is precisely its independence from experi-
ence, and therewith its independence from any differences between phantasy
and perception. However, this independence, in turn, depends on the essence
being common to both kinds of its concrete exemplification so that they are,
in this sense, essentially the same.
However, if there is a phenomenologically demonstrable parallelism be-
tween perception and phantasy, then phantasy and perception must show
themselves to be parallel; it must be evident that they are (cf. Husserl 1984,
p. 679 f.).4 However, Husserl’s claims in the Logical Investigations about the
“necessary parallelism” between perception and phantasy, whereby a possible
phantasy “of the same essence corresponds to every perception,” are at that
point not supported by phenomenological evidence and are nothing more than
unfounded assumptions.
In his early work, then, Husserl understands phantasy as a type
of pictorial presentation [Bildlichkeitsvorstellung] that resembles picture-
consciousness [Bildbewusstsein] (Husserl 1980, text 1 [1904/05], p. 16).
Picture-consciousness involves 1) the picture as physical object (the canvas
which somebody painted on, or the paper which somebody printed on, etc.);
2) the picture-object (the figure that appears through a certain distribution
of colors and shapes); and finally 3) the picture-subject (what is depicted
by that figure) (Ibid., pp. 19 ff.). Accordingly, the mental image of phantasy
(the figure appearing in front of ‘my mind’s eye’) is analogous to the picture-
object (the figure appearing on the canvas). Both picture-object and mental
image are ‘truly nothing’ (Ibid., p. 46). While the picture-subject appears in
them, they themselves do not appear at all; we see the picture-subject through
them. Thus, on this early account both phantasy and picture-consciousness
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are characterized by a ‘double objectivity’ [eine doppelte Gegensta¨ndlichkeit]
(Husserl 1980, Beilage 1 [1898], p. 112). In both cases, thus the analogy, we
apprehend something as representing something other than itself, as making
something other than itself appear.
However, the analogy between phantasy and picture-consciousness turns
out to be untenable. To begin with, the picture-object needs the physical picture
as a carrier of its sensual content. There simply would be no shape, no figure
without a canvas of which we have an actual sensation delivering a sensual
content that we apprehend as a shape or a figure. However, phantasmatic con-
tents, or phantasmata, cannot be said to be present to us in the same way. And
even if they were, it would remained inexplicable how they could and why they
would be apprehended precisely as something absent, as merely phantasized.
Moreover, in opposition to Husserl’s view in his early lectures on phantasy –
“When we phantasize, we intend some other thing than the appearing one,
which can be felt to be distinct from it and which pictorially represents it”
(Husserl 1980, text 1 [1904/05], p. 29) – it is not necessary that a phantasy
presentation intends an object ‘depicted’ by the mental image. Thus, nothing
in phantasy corresponds to the picture-subject in picture-consciousness. Fi-
nally, perception – which supposedly is parallel to phantasy – precisely does
not imply such a double intentionality. That is what it means to say that the
perceived appears ‘in person.’ Thus, if phantasy did show the same kind of
double intentionality as picture-consciousness, it would in fact be essentially
different from perception and not essentially like it.
Transcendental transformations: Husserl’s revised
account of imagination
During the time between the Logical Investigations and Ideas I Husserl’s
investigations of phantasy are first and foremost concerned with the status
of phantasmata. In his early work he had understood phantasmata as present
intuitive unities through which we intend phantasized objects. The decisive
step that Husserl takes in his revisions of this early account is precisely the
dismissal of an understanding of phantasmata as something present, as “a kind
of thing [ein Sa¨chelchen]” (Husserl 1950, p. 253).
We do not experience a phantasma as something present that presentifies
something absent. The phantasized object itself appears in phantasy, just as the
perceived object itself appears in perception. “One does not regard the image
as an object constituted in its own right, which one grasps as such and takes
as an image. Rather, through this peculiarly volatile something the intention
is directed to the object” (Husserl 1980, Beilage X [probably 1905], p. 161;
ibid. Beilage IX [probably 1905], p. 150; Husserl 1950, p. 90; Hua 1959, 112
f.; Husserl 1969, p. 183).
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Phantasmata, then, are presentified [vergegenwa¨rtigte] sensations (Husserl
1980, text 1 [1904/05], p. 77). Phantasy consciousness is directly and
thoroughly modified as presentifying consciousness [vergegenwa¨rtigendes
Bewußtsein]. The talk of phantasmata and, a fortiori, of the content-
apprehension-schema is thus revealed as a (perhaps for some analyses help-
ful) construction. It becomes clear that Husserl’s early notion of phantasy
indeed “falls behind his own proper method and introduces into phenomenol-
ogy remainders of empiricist positivism” (Saraiva 1970, p. 249). And in a
text on phantasy from 1909 Husserl decides to reject his earlier explanatory
model:
I had the schema ‘apprehended content and apprehension’ and that certainly made good
sense. But we do not have, first in the case of perception, in the concrete lived experience
a color as the content of apprehension and then the character of the apprehension, which
makes for the appearance. And likewise we do not, in the case of phantasy, have again a color
as content and then a modified apprehension, which makes for the phantasy appearance.
Rather: ‘Consciousness’ consists of consciousness through and through, and even sensations
as well as phantasmata are ‘consciousness’ (Husserl 1980, text 8 [1909], p. 265).
In other words, there is nothing in consciousness that is not already
intentional; there are no mere contents that can be viewed in separation
from their apprehensions. Phantasies do not consist of present contents pre-
sentifying a non-present object. Our phantasies are as immediate as our
perceptions.
What remained paradoxical according to the early account, namely that
something absent (the phantasized object) should be seen in something present
(the phantasma), is now resolved into the correlation of noesis and noema.
Noetically, phantasies are in fact present in so far as they are presently lived
through in inner consciousness. Noematically, however, what is presentified
is taken as absent. This way Husserl can analyze phantasy into reproduction
[Reproduktion] on the noetic side and presentification [Vergegenwa¨rtigung]
on the noematic side. Noetically speaking, a phantasy reproduces an orig-
inary lived experience. Noematically speaking, it presentifies an intended
object.
To sum up, both intentional acts – phatasy and perception – directly
constitute an object and let it appear; their objects display, as Husserl dis-
covers in his investigations on time-consciousness, the same temporal ad-
umbrations (Husserl 1969, p. 41); the presentified noema [das Noema der
Vergegenwa¨rtigung] is ‘consciousness of’ in essentially the same way as the
presentiated noema [das Noema der Gegenwa¨rtigung]. Noematically, then,
phantasy and perception are indeed essentially alike. Noetically, however,
phantasy and perception are essentially different. The phantasy noesis is not
given as original consciousness but as reproduction. As such a reproduction,
it always implies an original perception (cf. Bernet 2002, p. 340).
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Phantastic possibilities: Husserl’s transcendental
phenomenology of imagination
The merit of Husserl’s revised account of phantasy is that it puts us in the
position to structurally describe the noetic-noematic correlations of phantasy
consciousness in its givenness while we may disregard the ‘natural’ or em-
piricist question of the presence or absence of sensuous contents. According
to Husserl, the suspension of this question releases phenomenology from the
charge of subjectivist empiricism and constitutes phenomenology as a truly
transcendental enterprise.
In its purely eidetic attitude, which ‘brackets’ all transcendence, phenomenology nec-
essarily reaches on its own ground of pure consciousness this entire complex of tran-
scendental problems in the specific [phenomenological] sense and therefore deserves the
name transcendental phenomenology. On its own ground it must arrive not at regard-
ing the lived experiences as arbitrary dead entities, like ‘complexes of contents’ (. . .)
but at seizing the essentially genuine problem which they pose as intentional experiences
and do so purely by means of their eidetic essence as ‘consciousness of’ (Husserl 1950,
p. 198).
Most importantly, with the help of the phenomenological reduction we can
finally discover the “peculiar specialties phantasy accomplishes” (Husserl
1959, p. 134). For phantasy can in fact provide us with something that actual
perception is unable to offer: it constitutes possibilities. Although phantasy
with its “voluntary refrain from any position” belongs to “the realm of pur-
poselessness, of play” (Husserl 1980, text 20 [1921/24], p. 577; Husserl 2000,
pp. 10–14) and thus seems incapable of constitutive accomplishment (Husserl
1980, text 19 [probably 1922/23], p. 558), in its play it frees us from the limits
of our actual perceptions. It is “a modification of perception that is implied as
a possible and not as an actual act” (Bernet 2002, p. 339). What can be seen as
an as if-appearance of an actual object is in fact also an actual appearance of
a possible object (Husserl 1980, text 18 [1918], p. 507; Beilage LVI [probably
1918], p. 529; text 19 [probably 1922/23], pp. 547 f.; Husserl 1973, pp. 66,
94; Husserl 1986, p. 170). In phantasy, I can both presentiate a possibility or
presentify an actuality (Husserl 1959, pp. 116–119). The possibility that is
revealed in phantasy is not theoretical or conceptual; it is – very much in the
Kantian sense – a possible object of experience.
This insight is central to a phenomenological justification of a priori judg-
ments and eidetic laws. If phantasy accomplished nothing but the neutraliza-
tion of positing acts, if it only produced the mere ‘quasi’ of acts, it would be
indeed problematic to base any essential knowledge on it at all (Kuspit 1968,
pp. 16–33). If, however, phantasy can be said to posit possibilities, then phan-
tasy allows us to phenomenologically demonstrate a priori judgments. The
object phantasized, for example, a triangle, can then be taken as ‘any possible
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triangle’ or the possibility of triangles as such. In this way, any judgment
about the phantasized triangle becomes an a priori judgment about triangles
in general. Such possibilities are, in the phenomenological sense, scientifically
relevant – which is admittedly more obvious in the case of geometrical than
in the case of ordinary objects5 – because they do not merely refer to “what
can possibly be thought” [reines Denkbarsein]” (Husserl 1973a, p. 450 f.)
but to what can be intuited. They can be made evident in phenomenolog-
ical analysis and thereby yield, in Husserlian terms, synthetic judgments a
priori.
This precisely refutes the empiricist positivistic convictions of the
supremacy of perception and the derivative character of phantasy. For it means
that phantasy and perception are indeed parallel acts of consciousness, each
act with its own evidential force. Whereas perception provides us with ev-
idence in the realm of transcendent experience of actual objects, phantasy
provides us with possibilities and likewise does so with evidence. Thus, this
parallelism does not imply, as is so often claimed, that Husserl simply moulds
his notion of phantasy on his notion of perception and that therefore percep-
tion serves as a model for phantasy. The opposite holds true: by being able
to phenomenologically demonstrate this parallelism in his later analyses of
phantasy, Husserl is in the position to justify what other sciences and other
philosophical schools have taken for granted, namely that we can take what
we see in phantasy as possible experience, in other words, that we can use
phantasy as an illustrative model for experience in general.
Hence, what could only be assumed on the basis of Husserl’s early account
of phantasy and what is assumed by other philosophies and eidetic sciences is
now evident. “From every concrete actuality and every single feature that is
actually experienced and can be experienced in it the way is open to a realm of
ideal or pure possibility and, thereby, to a priori thought” (Husserl 1973a, p.
428). Fiction, then, is indeed the source, “from which the cognition of ‘eternal
truths’ takes its nourishment” (Husserl 1950, p. 148). It enables phenomenol-
ogy as “an a priori science, which remains in the realm of pure possibility
(i.e. pure imaginability [Vorstellbarkeit, Phantasierbarkeit]). Instead of mak-
ing judgments about transcendent existing entities [Seinswirklichkeiten], it
makes judgments about a priori possibilities and thereby draws out rules a
priori for reality” (Husserl 1973, Sections 12, 29).
Thus, what becomes evident in Husserl’s phenomenological account of
phantasy is that it fulfills a transcendental function, again very much in the
Kantian sense: it deals with “our way of cognizing objects in general in so
far as that way of cognizing is to be possible a priori” (Kant 1996, B25/A12).
Husserl thus clarifies phantasy as one of the crucial moments of his own
method (Husserl 1950, p. 121) and as one of the assumptions on which the
experimental sciences are based. A phenomenology of phantasy therefore
truly is first philosophy.
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Conclusion and prospect: Of what use
is transcendental phenomenology?
In the investigation above I showed that Husserl overcame the empiricist legacy
in his revised notion of phantasy and thus developed a truly transcendental
account. Further, I argued that the phenomenon of phantasy had a constitutive
impact on Husserl’s approach as a whole. The particular structure of phantasy
presentations – specifically the circumstance that they present something that
is itself absent – forced Husserl to rethink his content-apprehension-schema
and to thus shed his empiricist vestiges. This argument, however, implies that
Husserl’s move to a transcendental account of phantasy is indeed an ‘improve-
ment.’ After all, this assumption is hardly self-evident. On the contrary, the
entire project of transcendental phenomenology as such has been rigorously
critiqued. Varela and others have proposed that a naturalized phenomenology
should take the place of the transcendental endeavor. Such a naturalized phe-
nomenology would unify “the investigation of phenomenological data with the
multilevel explanation of what is to be considered, in a naturalist perspective,
as an essentially physical reality” (Petitot et al. 1999, p. 75).
On the contrary, a transcendental phenomenology is supposedly indebted
to an outdated notion of science that used to justify a certain kind of skep-
ticism towards any collaboration between phenomenology and the sciences
and therefore advanced their strict separation. Above all, transcendental phe-
nomenology is said to have announced the foundational status of phenomenol-
ogy without being able to see that, in Alan Murray’s words, “there is no realm
beyond the level of practice and that the truth of knowledge must necessarily
be coextensive with the methods and procedures by which it is produced”
(Murray 2002, p. 31). There are “no concepts which underlie any and all em-
pirical investigations” and questions “concerning methodology can never be
settled in advance of actual investigations, because any discussion of method
is necessarily going to entail certain presuppositions about the nature of the
objects to which a given method relates” (Ibid. 33). Thus, according to this
view, transcendental phenomenologists suffer from a “delusion of omnipo-
tence, the belief that they possess some special set of analytical tools which
allows them to ‘complete’ or ‘run ahead of the science” (Ibid. 43). As soon as
phenomenologists will be healed from this delusion, however, they will come
to realize that there “is no unique or transcendental perspective from which the
philosopher can survey and pronounce upon epistemological matters, there is
only the messy and imperfect business of research and theoretical innovation
(Ibid. 39).
In the light of these objections, I will conclude with a few words on what I
believe are the merits of a transcendental account. I readily admit that I have
a quite optimistic view on a possible common future for transcendental phe-
nomenology and the sciences, in particular cognitive sciences. Consequently,
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I do not see the need for an abolishment of transcendental phenomenology.
On the contrary, it is my contention that rather than being in opposition to the
project of naturalized phenomenology, transcendental accounts can make a
useful contribution to an interdisciplinary debate on matters of consciousness.
There are two common views on what transcendental phenomenology
supposedly entails that I would like to reject from the beginning. First,
transcendental phenomenology does not have to assume and then investigate
a ‘transcendental consciousness’ that stands over and above empirical
consciousness and is ontologically prior to the human brain. Second,
transcendental phenomenology does not have to assume any conceptual,
explanatory, or analytical priority, or even superiority over the sciences. In
short, transcendental phenomenology – regardless of positions to the contrary
possibly maintained by particular ‘transcendental phenomenologists’ –
neither necessarily implies that what it investigates is opposed to and superior
to anything empirical, nor does it necessarily imply that the method it employs
is opposed to and superior to any other scientific method.
But what makes a transcendental account transcendental then? A tran-
scendental phenomenology of consciousness suspends (ideally) all existing
theories of mind and scientific explanations of consciousness. It describes the
acts in which consciousness constitutes certain objects (be they perceptual,
imaginary, ideal etc.) and how they are experienced without speculating on
their causal explanations. These descriptions will display certain moments
that can be named by phenomenological terms (‘noema,’ ‘adumbration,’ ‘pre-
sentification,’ etc.) and thus reveal a phenomenological structure that belongs
to the investigated act or experience. This method is transcendental because
(a) it regards the ways in which consciousness constitutes experiences, ob-
jects, an environment, and ultimately what we call ‘the world’ (note here,
that by ‘consciousness’ is not necessarily meant egoistic; in fact, it could
involve intersubjective moments and environmental influences6) and (b) it
suspends (ideally) all natural presuppositions, i.e., theories of mind, scientific
hypotheses, etc. With respect to (a), this means that in his account of phan-
tasy Husserl does not regard phantasy presentations as ready-made ‘mental
images’ but as accomplishments of consciousness, that is, presentifications.
The problem that I drew attention to above, however, arose with (b), that is,
the fact that he did leave certain natural presuppositions in play initially.
Among these was the presupposition of ‘contents’ that lay in conscious-
ness to be ‘apprehended’ – thus my claim that it was only when Husserl
finally rejected the ‘content-apprehension-schema’ that his account became
transcendental.
What is gained by the final transcendental account of phantasy, then, is
a description of the experience of phantasy and of structures manifest in its
constitution. The description transcendental phenomenology is able to provide
does not anticipate or even pre-determine a particular conceptual paradigm
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that a scientific explanation would have to follow. Obviously, most philoso-
phers are – like me – just not trained to make any scientific claims. Thus, it
is very important – and can be considered a matter of philosophical ethos –
that we keep within the framework of our discipline. Therefore, my claim that
Husserl had to abandon the empiricist or positivist remains in his account
does not imply any objections against attempts to explain phantasy empiri-
cally. Rather, it means that from the start Husserl should not have illegitimately
introduced notions and terms from a domain, namely the domain of scientific
explanation, which his method is not equipped to deal with.
As phenomenologists, philosophers can provide the sciences with webs
of structural descriptions that can be used as points of reference for scien-
tific explanations. It is important to keep in mind here that these descriptive
webs cannot be reduced to any scientific explanation and vice versa. Husserl’s
‘transcendentalism’ strictly distinguishes between the region of nature and the
‘transcendental’ region of consciousness as two irreducibly distinct essences.
“According to Husserl, the ‘transcendental’ region of consciousness does not
reduce to the ‘natural’ region of physical causation” (Smith 1999, p. 106). As
David Woodruff Smith put it, “Consciousness and its intentionality are part of
nature. But their essence is not exhausted by physical composition or causal
role or neural function or computation (classical or connectionist) . . .” (Ibid.,
p. 83). Thus, to reduce the domain of consciousness to a scientific explana-
tion means to commit, not a category mistake, but, if you will, an ‘essence
mistake.’
But even then, the essential distinction between transcendental accounts
of consciousness and scientific accounts of the human brain could be taken
to suggest that transcendental phenomenology is simply irreconcilable with
the sciences and therefore unsuitable for any project that tries to promote
cooperation of the sciences and philosophy. However, we do not have to
draw that conclusion at all. Transcendental phenomenology and neuroscience,
in my view, can very well enter a dialogue of ongoing inter-correction
where interpretations of scientific facts have to be compatible with phe-
nomenological descriptions of human experience, while phenomenological
descriptions should not contradict, nor ignore scientific findings.7 This inter-
correction would be a truly inter-disciplinary process in which it is impor-
tant that each discipline is aware of its own method, its potential, and its
limitations.
There will be some for whom this account deflates the notion of the tran-
scendental. In my view, on the contrary, one of the most promising elements of
Husserlian phenomenology is that it allows for a reading of the transcenden-
tal standpoint that is clearly distinguished from the naturalistic (or empirical)
one without, however, being opposed to it. Husserl’s transformation of the
concept of transcendentality brings with it a new promise for a long-sought
cooperation between philosophy and the sciences.
DEVELOPMENT OF HUSSERL’S TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY 131
Notes
1. You will find a more extensive version of the first sections of this paper in Rudolf Bernet,
Donn Welton, Gina Zavota (eds), in press. Husserl: Critical Assessments (5 vol.). London:
Routledge.
2. Rudolf Bernet already pointed to the transformation of Husserl’s conception of phantasy
in Bernet (2002) pp. 336–339.
3. I would like to thank the participants of the 2002 Colloquium of the International Asso-
ciation for Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences on imagination for a stimulating
discussion of this problem. I am especially grateful for comments and suggestions I received
from Jonathan Cole, Shaun Gallagher, James Mensch, and Alan Murray.
4. For a similar view see Volonte´ (1997, p. 107).
5. One could say that this is the crux of the legitimation of the phenomenological method. In
the light of the Kantian notion of figurative synthesis, the question Husserl has to answer is
whether we can have pure intuitions (eide) that go beyond the Kantian forms of intuition.
But that’s a topic for a different paper.
6. After all, “the proper subject of perception is not the brain, but rather the whole embodied
animal interacting with its environment” (Thompson et al. 1999, p. 185 f.).
7. Jean-Luc Petit (2003) also emphasizes the compatibility of transcendental phenomenology
and neuroscientific research.
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